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EXCLUSION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FROM ASYLUM:
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 
Ben Saul
*
Pressure  to  automatically  exclude  terrorists  from  asylum  has  increased  since  the  late 
1990s,  including  exclusion  based  on  mere  membership  of  terrorist  organizations.  Such 
pressure has emanated from the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, regional 
organizations, States and even UNHCR. Yet terrorism is not listed as a separate ground 
of exclusion in the 1951  Refugee Convention,  and there is no internationally accepted 
definition of terrorist offences which could serve as a principled basis of exclusion. In the 
absence  of  an  international  definition,  reference  to  terrorism  in  exclusion  decisions 
endangers refugees. Exclusion must be based on an individual assessment of whether a 
person meets the criteria for exclusion in Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
Soon after the Second World War, the drafters of the Refugee Convention were well 
aware of the security concerns of States and the Convention has always ensured that 
those who perpetrate serious terrorist-type acts are excluded. The 1946 Constitution 
of  the  International  Refugee  Organization  had  excluded  from  the  IRO’s  mandate 
persons who ‘participated in any terrorist organization’ after the war. Yet the drafters 
of the Refugee Convention decided not to explicitly exclude terrorists, indicating that 
the exclusion provisions of the Convention were considered sufficient.  
 
Terrorist-type acts will qualify as excludable acts under Article 1F if they reach an 
appropriate  level  of  gravity  warranting  denial  of  protection.  Yet  as  a  UK  tribunal 
stated in Thayabaran: ‘The question is not whether the appellant can be characterized 
as a terrorist, but rather whether the words of the exemption clause apply to him’.
1
Exclusion must be based on individual responsibility and be determined on a case by 
case basis, according to the legal criteria specified in Article 1F—not by automatic 
exclusion of all suspected terrorists, which risks denying procedural fairness. 
 
There is no international legal definition of terrorism which could be used as the basis 
for  exclusion,  and  national  definitions  are  widely  divergent—potentially  leading  to 
incongruous exclusion results. Article 1F is an international standard which cannot be 
determined by reference to unilateral national definitions of terrorism. Since some 
national definitions criminalize relatively minor conduct, reliance on such definitions 
in exclusion decisions endangers refugees in need of protection.  While there may 
indeed  be  cogent  policy  reasons  for  defining  terrorism,
2 until  the  international 
community agrees on a definition, reference to the term is of little legal or practical 
use in excluding undeserving persons from international protection. 
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Paper presented at the conference on Asylum and Migration, Policy and Practice in the EU Accession 
Countries, Czech Helsinki Committee and Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre, Prague, 5-6 June 2004. 
This paper is a summary of a much longer work in progress, available from the author. 
1 Quoted in Gurung v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04870, 15 Oct 2002, (2002) 14 IJRL 382, para 98; see also T v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1995] 2 All ER 1042, [1995] 1 WLR 545; T v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865, [1996] 2 WLR 766; Amirthalingam (11561), 10 Nov 1994; 
Nanthakumar (11619), 22 Nov 1994; Arulendran (11827), 19 Jan 1995. 
2 See B Saul, ‘International Terrorism as a European Crime: The Policy Rationale for Criminalization’ 
(2003) 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 323.  2
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
General Assembly resolutions have urged States to refrain from granting asylum to 
terrorists  and  to  prevent  refugee  status  being  abused  by  involvement  in  terrorist 
activity.
3 A Declaration  of  1996  provides  further  that  any  measures  taken  must 
conform  with  national  and  international  law,  including  human  rights,  and  should 
consider  relevant  information  about  whether  an  asylum  seeker  is  subject  to 
investigation for, is charged with, or has been convicted of, ‘offences connected with 
terrorism’.
4 Thus it is not necessary for an individual to commit acts of terrorism to be 
considered for exclusion from asylum or refugee status, since it is enough, for the 
General  Assembly,  that  offences  connected  with  terrorism  are  committed.  The 
Declaration also provides that those awaiting processing of their applications ‘may not 
thereby avoid prosecution for terrorist acts’.
5
Resolutions of the General Assembly are only recommendatory and impose no legal 
obligations on States. Regardless of their status in public international law, UNHCR 
regards such resolutions as ‘binding on UNHCR’.
6 The 1996 Declaration implies ‘an 
automatic link between asylum and terrorism’ and suggests that refugee law does not 
already adequately prevent the abuse of asylum by terrorists.
7 The Declaration does 
not  define  terrorism  and  therefore  invites  States  to  unilaterally  (and  subjectively) 
identify and exclude ‘terrorists’.
8 Recommending ‘peremptory exclusion’ of terrorists is 
of ‘questionable propriety’ in the absence of a definition.
9
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
In Resolution 1269 (1999), the Security Council called on States to deny safe haven to 
those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts (by apprehending, prosecuting or 
extraditing them) and to refrain from granting refugee status to terrorists.
10 Resolution 
1373 (2001), enacted under Chapter VII of the Charter, similarly called upon States to 
prevent the granting of refugee status to those who plan, facilitate or participate in 
terrorism,  and  to  ensure  that  refugee  status  ‘is  not  abused  by  the  perpetrators, 
organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not 
recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists’.
11 
None  of  these  resolutions  provides  any  definition  of  terrorism  for  the  purpose  of 
excluding terrorists from asylum, thus conferring discretion on States to unilaterally 
determine  who  is  excludable.  Considering  the  wide  range  of  conduct  covered  by 
national definitions, this risks excluding persons who have not committed acts grave 
enough to be excluded under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.  
 
3 UNGA Res 49/60 (1994), para 5(f); 1994 Declaration, para 5(f); UNGA Res 51/210 (1996), annexed 
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, para 
3. 
4 1996 UNGA Declaration, ibid, para 3. 
5 Ibid, para 4. 
6 M Kingsley  Nyinah,  ‘Exclusion  Under  Article  1F:  Some  Reflections  on  Context,  Principles  and 
Practice’ (2000) 12 IJRL (Special Supp) 295, 312. 
7 Kingsely Nyinah, 312-313; 1996 UNGA Declaration, op cit, paras 3-4. 
8 Kingsely Nyinah, ibid, 313; J Hathaway and C Harvey, ‘Framing Refugee Protection in the New World 
Order’ (2001) 34 Cornell Intl LJ 257, 269. 
9 Hathaway and Harvey, ibid, 269. 
10 UNSC Res 1269 (1999), para 4. 
11 UNSC Res 1373 (2001), para 3(f)-(g). UNSC Res 1377 (2001), Annexed Declaration, also underlined 
States’ obligation to deny safe haven to terrorists. 3
The asylum measures in Resolution 1373 are recommendatory, not mandatory. Under 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, mandatory measures under Chapter VII could override 
existing international refugee law in the event of a conflict.
12 Though non-binding, the 
resolution  ‘reinforces  the  perception  that  the  institution  of  asylum  is  somehow  a 
terrorist’s refuge’ and has provoked a ‘wave’ of restrictive national laws.
13 In supervising 
the  implementation  of  Resolution  1373,  the  Security  Council’s  Counter-Terrorism 
Committee has given the impression that States are required to exclude terrorists. 
 
UN DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTION 
A draft UN Comprehensive Terrorism Convention has been under negotiation since 
2000, which attempts to define terrorism generically as a transnational crime. Article 7 
of the UN Draft Convention proposes to require States to ensure ‘that refugee status is 
not granted to any person in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering 
that he or she has committed’ a terrorist offence. While such measures must be taken 
‘in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including 
international human rights law’, the aim is to exclude from refugee status persons who 
commit  terrorist  offences  as  defined.  The  preamble  states  that  the  Refugee 
Convention  does  not  protect  perpetrators  of  terrorist  acts,  while  noting  that  the 
principle of non-refoulement must be complied with.
14 The draft convention potentially 
gives rise to conflict with refugee law, where terrorist offences in the draft convention 
are not of sufficient gravity to warrant exclusion in refugee law.  
 
REGIONAL MEASURES  
In  the  Americas,  the  Inter-American  Convention  against  Terrorism  2002  requires 
States to exclude from refugee status persons in relation to whom there are ‘serious 
reasons’ for considering that they have committed an offence in the listed international 
treaties (eg hijacking, hostage taking, etc). This may have the effect of automatically 
excluding  the  defence  of  duress  for  those  who,  for  example,  commit hijacking  to 
escape persecution, where there is an imminent threat of serious unavoidable harm. 
Such cases occurred in the 1950s when Czechs fled communism and again in the 1990s 
with refugees fleeing from Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
In Europe, Council of Europe Guidelines of 2002 state that refugee status ‘must be 
refused’ where the State has serious grounds to believe that the asylum seeker has 
‘participated  in  terrorist  activities’.
15  No  definition  of  ‘terrorist  activities’  or  what 
constitutes ‘participation’ is supplied, so it is possible that conduct which is not serious 
enough to warrant exclusion may be treated as excludable. 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
In the EU, a Common Position on Combating Terrorism of December 2001 requires 
States to (1) deny safe haven and the use of EU territory to terrorists (Arts 6-7); and 
prevent the movement of terrorists (Art 10). It also requires States, before granting 
 
12 Although if non-refoulement is jus cogens, the lawfulness of mandatory Security Council measures 
requiring States to violate non-refoulement would be highly questionable. 
13 M Zard, ‘Exclusion, Terrorism and the Refugee Convention’ (2002) 13 Forced Migration Rev 32, 32.  
14 2000– UN Draft Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention, preamble. 
15 Council of Europe, Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism, 15 July 2002, paragraph 
XII(1). 4
r e f u g e e  s t a t u s ,  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a n  a s y l u m  s e e k e r  h a s  n o t  ‘ p l a n n e d ,  f a c i l i t a t e d  o r  
participated in the commission of terrorist acts’ (Art 16). It further requires States to 
‘ensure that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organisers or facilitators of 
terrorist acts and that claims of political motivation are not recognised as grounds for 
refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists’ (Art 17). 
 
The Common Position does not contain a definition of terrorism to be applied for the 
purposes of asylum determination or refugee exclusion. Presumably, the definition of 
terrorism  in  the  EU  Framework  Decision  is  the  operative  definition  of  terrorism 
a p p l i c a b l e .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  U N H C R  h a s  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e  l e s s e r  o f f e n c e s  i n  t h e  E U  
Framework Decision—extortion, theft or robbery, and unlawful seizure of or damage 
to public facilities—may not be serious enough to activate the exclusion clauses. 
 
A n  E U  C o m m i s s i o n  W o r k i n g  D o c u m e n t  o f  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1 s t a t e s  t h a t  a n  E U  
definition of terrorist offences ‘may be a basis for relying on Article 1(F)(b)’ as well as 
being ‘a helpful way of illuminating UN standards of… “terrorist acts” for exclusion 
under Article 1F. It was also suggested that the linking terrorism to the grounds of 
exclusion  may  also  trigger  the  use  of  accelerated  asylum  assessment  regimes  with 
fewer procedural rights, allowing for the dismissal of claims as ‘manifestly unfounded’. 
This is despite the insistence by the European Parliament that the inclusion clauses of 
the Refugee Convention should be considered before exclusion clauses. 
 
Ultimately,  Article  12  of  the  EU  Council  Qualification  Directive  of  April  2004 
incorporates  the  exclusion  clauses  in  the  Refugee  Convention  into  EU  legislation. 
While Article 1F(a) of the Convention remains unchanged, Article 1F(b) is added to 
by the statement that ‘particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly 
political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes’.
16 This widens the 
scope of Article 1F(b) by providing a legislative basis on which to exclude atrocious 
crimes, beyond the text of Article 1F(b). House of Lords notes that this ‘plainly affords 
a narrower ground for claiming asylum’ (Sepet [2003]). 
 
Moreover, UN purposes and principles referred to in Article 1F(c) of the Convention 
were  further  defined  in  the  EU  Directive  as  being  ‘set  out  in  the  Preamble  and 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations’. A recital was also added to the 
preamble  which  explicitly  recognizes  that  UN  resolutions  on  combating  terrorism 
declare that terrorist acts are contrary to UN purposes and principles (Recital 22). 
Another recital states that the notion of national security and public order covers cases 
where a person belongs to an association which supports international terrorism or 
supports such an association (Recital 28). Although only of interpretive value, these 
recitals do not draw any distinction between terrorist acts of lesser gravity and those 
which reach a level of seriousness warranting exclusion under Article 1F. 
 
The EU Directive on Minimum Procedures of April 2004 permits States to prioritize 
or accelerate determination procedures if an applicant ‘clearly does not qualify’ as a 
refugee under the Qualification Directive or is a danger to national security or public 
order (Art 23(4)).
17 According to the interpretive recital in the Qualification Directive, 
this allows asylum claims of suspected terrorists to be expedited. In such cases, an 
application may be considered ‘manifestly unfounded’.
18 Yet elementary considerations 
 
16 EU Council Qualification Directive (2004), Art 14(2)(b). 
17 EU Council Directive on Minimum Procedures (2004), Arts 23(4)(b) and Art 23(4)(l) respectively.  
18 Ibid, Art 29(2). 5
of  procedural  fairness  require  that  the  claims  of  suspected  terrorists  must  be 
considered in the same manner as all other claims.
19 Exclusion should only be based on 
an individualized determination of an individual’s personal circumstances and a full 
and proper assessment of all the evidence.
20 
Recent EU legislation also conflates the exclusion clauses in Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention with withdrawal of status on security grounds in Article 33(2). Article 
14(5)  of  the  EU  Qualification  Directive  permits  refugee  status  to  be  refused  on 
grounds  equivalent  to  those  in  Article  33(2)  of  the  Convention.  This  blurring  is 
incompatible with the Refugee Convention. Whereas Article 1F concerns historical 
acts,
21 Article 33(2) focuses on the future risk posed by an individual,
22 although past 
acts may be evidence of future risk. The wider scope of Article 33(2) cannot lawfully 
be used as a fourth exclusion clause supplementing Article 1F. 
 
ARTICLE 1F OF THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION  
Under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, exclusion is required where there are 
serious reasons for considering that a person has committed a crime against peace, war 
crime, or crime against humanity. Terrorism is unlikely to constitute a crime against 
p e a c e  ( a g g r e s s i o n ) ,  w h i c h  m u s t  t y p i c a l l y  b e  c o m m i t t e d  b y  S t a t e  o r g a n s ,  a g e n t s  o r  
officials, and in any case there have been no prosecutions for crimes against peace since 
the Nuremberg trials after the Second World War.
23 
During  armed  conflict,  terrorist  acts  may  constitute  a  war  crime  in  some 
circumstances, such as where deliberate indiscriminate attacks are made on civilians, or 
for  acts  such  as  hostage  taking).  There  are  also  specialised  terrorism  offences  in 
international humanitarian law, including (in international armed conflict) prohibitions 
on measures of terrorism (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art 33(1)) and on spreading 
terror  among  civilians  (Protocol  I,  Art  51(2)).  Similar  prohibitions  exist  in  non-
international armed conflicts (Protocol II, Art 51(2)  (spreading terror); Art 4(2)(d), 
Protocol II (acts of terrorism)). In Galic (2003), the ICTY found that the sniping and 
shelling civilians in Sarajevo was intended to spread terror and constituted a war crime.  
 
International definition of terrorist offences would only be relevant to Article 1F(a) if 
the text of the provision were amended to exclude terrorist crimes, or alternatively if 
any international terrorism offence was classified as a crimes against humanity. 
 
Under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, refugee status cannot be granted to a 
person  where  there  are  ‘serious  reasons’  for  considering  that  ‘he  has  committed  a 
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee’. There is little international agreement on meaning of the terms 
 
19 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees under the Exclusion 
Clauses’ (2000) 12 IJRL (Special Supp) 317, 334. 
20  M  Bliss,  ‘Serious  Reasons  for  Considering’:  Minimum  Standards  of  Procedural  Fairness  in  the 
Application of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses’ (2000) 12 IJRL (Special Supp) 92, 130-131. 
21 Indra Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 4870, 14 Oct 2002; [2003] 
Imm AR 115; [2003] INLR 133 (Collins J, A Mackey, HH Storey), para 102. 
22 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 Sept 2003, HCR/GIP/03/05; (2003) 15 IJRL 
492; para 4. 
23 The crime of aggression is included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Art 5) 
but is yet to be defined at a future codification conference. 6
‘serious’, ‘criminal’ and ‘non-political’. Many national courts draw by analogy on the 
‘political’  offence  exception  in  extradition  law,  which  is  clearly  related  to  Article 
1F(b), but they are not identical in scope. Whereas extradition law is largely a product 
o f  n a t i o n a l  a n d  b i l a t e r a l  l a w ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  h i g h l y  v a r i a b l e ,  A r t i c l e  1F ( b )  i s  a n  
international law treaty provision. 
 
Is terrorism serious, criminal, and non-political? The position is different in different 
national  legal  systems.  There  is  still  no  binding  international  agreement  on  the 
definition of terrorism. But regional treaties, the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council, and national criminal laws in many States all regard terrorism as serious and 
criminal.  Recently,  the  UN  Terrorist  Financing  Convention  and  the  UN  Terrorist 
Bombings Convention both included provisions excluding their respective offences 
from  the  political  offence  exception  in  extradition  law  (though  they  are  silent  in 
relation to refugee status). 
 
Tests used by different courts to determine whether an offence is political include 
whether  violent  acts  are  proportionate  and  proximate  (not  too  remote),  whether 
indiscriminate violence or atrocious or particularly cruel means are used etc. Terrorist 
acts often fail these tests for being disproportionate, remote, barbarous and so on. It is 
not certain, however, that terrorist acts will always fail the test, particularly where 
terrorist acts are a response to severe and systematic State repression, where there is an 
irreconcilable asymmetry of resources between the State and its opponents, and all 
other means of redress have failed. Defences of duress and necessity are relevant. 
 
Recently,  some  courts  have  used  the  term  ‘terrorism’  to  characterise  acts  as  non-
political, as a less subjective and judgmental test than the tests described above. In T v
Home Secretary (1996), Lord Mustill said in the UK House of Lords that: 
 
criteria such as remoteness, causation, atrociousness and proportionality seem 
too  subjective  to  found  the  consistency  of  decision  which  must  surely  be 
essential in a jurisdiction of this kind. By contrast, once it is made clear that 
terrorism is not simply a label for violent conduct of which the speaker deeply 
disapproves, the term is capable of definition and objective application.
24 
Lord Mustill invoked the 1937 League of Nations Terrorism Convention definition as 
‘serviceable’, that is: ‘criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the 
general public’.
25 Lord Slynn agreed with that definition, adding that terrorism may also 
i n c l u d e  a c t s  ‘ l i k e l y  t o  c a u s e ,  i n j u r y  t o  p e r s o n s  w h o  h a v e  n o  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
government of the state’, though that definition was not intended to be exhaustive.  
 
In  Suresh, a national  security  case  (Article  33  rather  than  1F),  involvement  in 
‘terrorism’ in Canada was a basis for deportation, but terrorism was not defined in the 
relevant  legislation.  The  Canadian  court  found  it  unnecessary  to  define  terrorism 
‘exhaustively’ for the limited purposes of the immigration proceedings but adopted a 
working definition based on in Article 2(1)(b) of the Terrorist Financing Convention: 
 
24 T v Home Secretary (1996) (Lord Mustill), op cit. 
25 For an analysis of the 1937 League of Nations Convention, see B Saul, ‘The Legal Response of the 
League of Nations to Terrorism’ (forthcoming 2005, Journal of International Criminal Justice). 7
Any… act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate  a  population,  or  to  compel  a  government  or  an  international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
 
In contrast, other courts have been more sceptical of using terrorism until it is defined. 
As stated by the UK Immigration Appeals Tribunal in Gurung:
until such time as we have an accepted international definition of terrorism 
and  one  which  clearly  matches  up  with  definitions  contained  within  sub-
clauses of Art 1F, it remains important to note material differences between 
Art 1F offences and terrorist offences. Regular use of the concept of terrorism 
as  a  tool  for  identifying  crimes  contrary  to  Art  1F  must  await  definitive 
codification by the international community.
26 
In Singh, Justice Gaudron of the Australian High Court similarly stated of terrorism 
t h a t  ‘ s u c h  d e s c r i p t i o n s  a r e  i m p r e c i s e  a n d  m a y ,  o n  t h a t  a c c o u n t ,  i n v o l v e  o v e r -
simplification. Moreover, and more to the point, they find no expression in the text of 
the Convention itself.’
27 
The  European  Council  for  Refugees  and  Exiles  has  called  for  the  international 
definition  of  terrorism  for  clarity  in  relation  to  the  exclusion  clauses.  UN  The 
Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention could, for instance, include a provision 
depoliticizing terrorism and regarding it explicitly as non-political for the purposes of 
Article  1F(b).  The  definition  of  terrorist  offences  would  have  to  be  appropriately 
narrow so that minor conduct does not give rise to exclusion. Department of Justice 
statistics in the United States show that most terrorist convictions since 2001 in the US 
have resulted in prison sentences of 12 months or less, suggesting that terrorist offences 
in that country are capturing relatively minor conduct.  
 
Under Article 1(F)(c) of the Refugee Convention, refugee status cannot be granted to 
a person where there are ‘serious reasons’ for considering that ‘he has been guilty of 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. UN purposes and 
principles are specified in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, but are dynamic not 
static, but they are very broad and vague, for example: peace and security, friendly 
relations  among  states,  self-determination,  and  international  cooperation.  While 
UNHCR does not regard this provision as an independent ground, courts disagree. Yet 
due to the vagueness and potential for abuse, it should be interpreted restrictively. 
 
In the Canadian case of Pushpanathan, the test for acts contrary to UN purposes and 
principles  was  as  follows:  (1)  a  consensus  in  international  that  acts  constitute 
sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental human rights as to amount 
to  persecution,  or  (2)  are  explicitly  recognized  as  contrary  to  the  purposes  and 
principles of the United Nations (including in international decisions and resolutions). 
Acts found to be contrary to UN purposes and principles under these tests included 
torture, terrorism, hostage taking, apartheid, but not drug trafficking. 
 
26 Gurung, op cit, para 100. 
27 MIMA v Singh [2002] HCA 7 (Gaudron J). 8
Certainly a number of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have 
regarded  terrorism  as  contrary  to  UN  purposes  and  principles.  Although  these 
resolutions are non-binding, questions have been raised about whether these political 
organs are competent to ‘reinvent’ UN purposes and principles. It can, however, be 
more plausibly argued that these resolutions are merely interpreting the scope of the 
Charter, rather than inventing new principles and purposes.  
 
An increasing number of cases have excluded persons on this ground for terrorism. In 
applying Article 1F(c) to terrorist acts, each act should be assessed individually to 
determine whether it is contrary to UN principles and purposes, and it is not sufficient 
to rely on a blanket assertion that every terrorist act is excludable. Some terrorist acts 
may not be serious enough to threaten UN purposes and principles.  
 
TERRORISTS AS EXCLUDABLE NON-STATE ACTORS  
Traditionally,  only  State  officials  or  agents  fell  within  Article  1F(c),  since  the  UN 
Charter is primarily addressed to States. However, courts have increasingly recognized 
that non-State actors can commit acts of comparable severity. In Pushpanathan, the 
court stated that: 
 
Although it may be more difficult for a non-state actor to perpetrate human 
rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution without the State thereby 
implicitly adopting those acts, the possibility should not be excluded… 
 
This  is  particularly  the  case  where  organizations  exercise  quasi-governmental 
authority, or pursue political objectives. In Sivakumar, a Canadian court stated: 
 
it can no longer be said that individuals without any connection to the state, 
especially those involved in paramilitary or armed revolutionary movements, 
can be immune from the reach of international criminal law. On the contrary, 
they are now governed by it.
28 
It is therefore arguable that Article 1F(c) extends to private terrorist organizations. 
 
MEMBERSHIP OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Exclusion  is  based  on  individual  responsibility.  Different  types  of  individual 
responsibility  include  committing,  ordering,  soliciting,  inducing,  aiding,  abetting, 
attempting to commit crime, and contributing to a common purpose (Rome Statute of 
the ICC, Art 25), as well as command responsibility in armed conflict.  
 
Mere membership of a terrorist organization is not sufficient to exclude an individual, 
and personal and knowing participation in excludable crimes is necessary. However, 
e x c l u s i o n  m a y  b e  b a s e d  o n  c o m p l i c i t y ,  t h e  t e s t  f o r  w h i c h  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  
Canadian  case  of  Ramirez: (1)  voluntary  membership  in  a  violent,  criminal 
organization;  (2)  personal  and  knowing  participation  in  its  acts;  and  (3)  failure  to 
disassociate from the group at the earliest safe opportunity. 
 
In addition to establishing responsibility for complicity, the court in Ramirez stated 
more controversially that ‘where an organization is principally directed to a limited, 
 
28 Sivakumar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (CA) [1994] 1 FC 433. 9
brutal purpose, such as a secret police activity, mere membership may by necessity 
involve personal and knowing participation in persecutorial acts’. Similarly in Gurung,
a UK tribunal found that membership may almost be sufficient for exclusion. 
 
A f t e r  11 S e p t  2 0 0 1,  U N H C R  s t a t e d  t h a t  p r o o f  o f  v o l u n t a r y  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a n  
notoriously violent group (including terrorism) gives rise to a rebuttable presumption 
of  personal  and  knowing  participation  in  the  group’s  activities.  This  reverses  the 
burden  of  proof  and  is  now  part  of  UNHCR’s  revised  exclusion  guidelines.  The 
presumption  will  be  particularly  strong  where  the  individual  is  in  a  position  of 
authority in the organization, and where the organization uses terrorist methods. 
 
Factors  considered  relevant  to  rebutting  the  presumption  include:  voluntariness  of 
membership, the role and position of the individual in the organization and ability to 
i n f l u e n c e  i t ,  t h e  a c t u a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  a n d  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  a n d  t h e  
fragmentation of groups and loss of control over parts of the group. Disassociation is 
not required if the person would encounter serious personal risk. 
 
Clearly,  there  is  a  danger  that  the  application  of  the  presumption  will  lead  to 
automatic and peremptory exclusion. This would be a denial of procedural fairness. 
Exclusion  must  only  occur  following  consideration  of  an  individual’s  personal 
responsibility. There are also a number of other serious difficulties with presumptions 
of personal and knowing participation based on membership of a group. 
 
Firstly, who is a member? Unlike members of Nazi criminal organizations, members 
do not carry membership cards and there are no membership lists. Does it include 
persons who support the humanitarian activities of violent organizations with mixed 
charitable purposes? In Suresh, members were defined to include associates of members 
– a circular definition which results in an infinite regression of exclusion based on 
tenuous links, such as the exclusion of family, friends, teachers and so on. 
 
Secondly,  how  are  terrorist  organizations  identified?  UNHCR  suggests  that  both 
international lists (provided by the Security Council) and national lists are relevant. 
Yet  national  lists  are  open  to  political  manipulation  by  governments  against  their 
opponents, are influenced by foreign policy considerations, and different States have 
very different definitions of terrorism. This may lead to inappropriate exclusions. 
 
The EU Framework Decision defines a ‘terrorist group’ as ‘a structured group of more 
than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit 
terrorist offences’. A ‘structured group’ is then defined as ‘a group that is not randomly 
formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have 
formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed 
structure’. UK anti-terrorism legislation more broadly defines an organization as ‘any 
association or combination of persons’. 
 
Other factors are also relevant to assessing the legitimacy of the organization: its public 
support, democratic objectives, resistance against oppression, use of limited means, the 
targets of violence, whether violence is used as last resort after exhausting peaceful 
means of redress, and qualification for combatancy in armed conflict. 
 
Yet it is questionable whether courts and judges, let alone front-line decision-makers, 
can  easily  make  such  complex  judgments.  Factors  such  as  the  conditions  of 
combatancy  in  armed  conflict  are  objectively  verifiable  by  reference  to  treaty 10
provisions and customary rules, and norms of proportionality are also recognized. Yet 
i t  i s  f a r  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a  c o u r t  t o  a s s e s s  m o r e  s u b j e c t i v e  m a t t e r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  
existence of the rule of law in another State, the availability of peaceful means of 
redress and whether such means have been exhausted, and the gravity of oppression 
necessary to justify violent resistance. Although human rights standards provide some 
guidance, the factual judgments involved are extremely difficult. Many of these factors 
are non-justiciable political questions, with no applicable legal standards. 
 
The United States legislation has gone farthest in automatically excluding persons from 
applying  for  asylum  if  they  if  they  are  representatives  of  a  designated  foreign 
organization engaged in terrorist activity which threatens the security of the US or its 
nationals.  Terrorism  is  broadly  defined  by  national  law.  Statutory  bars  based  on 
membership  of  proscribed  organizations  undermine  basic  standards  of  procedural 
fairness, because exclusion is not based on an determination of personal involvement 
in, and individual responsibility for, specific excludable conduct. 
 
EXPULSION OF REFUGEES: ARTICLE 33(2) 
 
Under Article 33(2), non-refoulement ‘may not… be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which 
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious 
crime,  constitutes  a  danger  to  the  community  of  that  country’.  This  provision  on 
withdrawal of protection is distinct from Article 1F exclusion clauses, though State 
practice  sometimes  confuses  them.  Indeed,  Article  14(5)  of  the  EU  Qualification 
Directive provides that the grounds for withdrawal of protection in Article 33(2) of 
the Refugee Convention may be used as a basis for excluding persons before they are 
granted refugee status. This effectively establishes a fourth exclusion clause. 
 
Persons subject to expulsion under Article 33(2) are still entitled to complementary 
forms of human right protection, such as the prohibition on return to torture. As the 
European Court of Human Rights stated in Chahal:
Article  3  enshrines  one  of  the  most  fundamental  values  of  democratic 
society…. The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States 
in  modern  times  in  protecting  their  communities  from  terrorist  violence.  
However, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute 
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective 
of the victim’s conduct…. Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no 
derogation from it is permissible… even in the event of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation…
29 
International treaties (such as the ICCPR and the Torture Convention) only prevent 
refoulement  to  torture, but  not  return  to  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment. This has allowed States to ‘contract out’ ill-treatment of detainees to less 
scrupulous  States,  for  interrogation  purposes.
30 R e c e n t  r e s e a r c h  b y  H u m a n  R i g h t s  
Watch has shown that diplomatic assurances have failed to protect deportees from ill-
 
29 Chahal, para 79, citing Soering, 34, para 88; Ireland v UK, 18 Jan 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para 163; 
Tomasi v France, 27 Aug 1992, Series A, no 241-A, 42, para 115. 
30 See B Saul, ‘Torturing Terrorists After September 11: Dershowitz’ Torture Warrant’ (forthcoming 
2004, International Journal of Law & Psychiatry). 11
treatment in many jurisdictions involved in the ‘war on terror’.
31 Suspected terrorists 
are particularly at risk of torture, including while in the custody of rights-respecting 
liberal democracies. There has also been pressure to weaken the absolute character of 
the prohibition on return to torture, such as a proposed judicial ‘torture warrant’. 
 
Further, in Suresh, a Canadian court found that deportation of a suspected terrorist to 
torture might be justified ‘in exceptional circumstances’ of State security. The decision 
is contrary to international law, because the absolute prohibition leaves no room for 
‘balancing’ the risk of torture against national security interests. Yet this view received 
support from the EU Commission in a Working Paper after 11 September 2001, which 
stated that 
 
the European Court of Human Rights may in the future again have to rule on 
questions  relating  to  the  interpretation  of  Article  3,  in  particular  on  the 
question in how far there can be a ‘balancing act’ between the protection needs 
of the individual, set off against the security interests of a state.
32 
This was considered particularly relevant to the ‘unresolved’ legal position of persons 
excluded from protection but who are not removable,
33 especially given the use of 
indefinite detention by some States.
34 Such a view seeks to undermine the absolute 
nature of the existing prohibition on torture.  
 
APPLICABILITY OF NON-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSES?
While some writers argue that the non-discrimination clauses found in extradition law 
should  apply  to  exclusion  decisions  in  refugee  law,  such  application  is  logically 
incompatible with the structure of the Refugee Convention. Article 1F intentionally 
permits  return  to  persecution  for  persons  considered  undeserving  or  unworthy  of 
protection. Since discrimination is a form of persecution, to apply non-discrimination 
clauses  to  an  excluded  person  would  defeat  the  purpose  of  Article  1F,  allowing 
excluded persons a second chance to prove persecution.  
 
This problem illustrates that the denial of protection in refugee law to persons because 
they  are  ‘unworthy’  is  outdated  given  developments  in  modern human rights  law. 
Human rights are rights, not privileges, and cannot be taken away for bad behaviour. 
While the human rights of serious domestic criminals may be limited on objective, 
public interest grounds (eg, imprisonment is a legitimate restriction on freedom of 
movement),  a  serious  domestic  criminal  cannot  be  racially  vilified  or  sexually 
harassed—unlike persons excluded from refugee status who may be returned to such 
treatment.  Domestically,  States  do  not  permit  criminals  to  face  persecution  or 
discrimination simply because they become ‘undeserving’ of protection. Perhaps it is 
time to revise the Refugee Convention to more fully respect human dignity. 
 
Decisions not to exclude a person, or to offer them complementary protection, do not 
result  in  impunity  for  serious  criminals.  For  treaty  crimes  of  quasi-universal 
 
31  Human  Rights  Watch,  ‘Empty  Promises:  Diplomatic  Assurances  No  Safeguard  against  Torture’, 
Washington DC, April 2004: hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404 (18 June 2004). 
32 EU Commission Working Document, The Relationship Between Safeguarding Internal Security and 
Complying with International protection obligations and instruments, COM (2201) 743 final, 5 Dec 
2001, para 2.3.1. 
33 Ibid, para 2.4. 
34 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), ss 21-33. 12
jurisdiction, such as hijacking or hostage taking, prosecution in the State of refuge may 
be  an  alternative  to  return  to  persecution.  Prosecution  before  the  ICC  or  ad  hoc 
criminal tribunals may also be a possibility. However, impunity may occur in a narrow 
range  of  cases,  where  persons  are  not  returnable  but  no  extraterritorial  basis  of 
jurisdiction exists. Although the aut dedere aut judicare principle has expanded to 
c o v e r  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  r a n g e  o f  s e r i o u s  c r i m e s ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a p p l y  t o  a l l  
excludable acts under Article 1F. Yet since September 11, States have increasingly 
asserted universal jurisdiction over terrorist offences (as defined in national law), so the 
scope of unpunishable conduct has narrowed significantly.  
 
CONCLUSION 
There is little evidence that international refugee law has been misused by suspected 
terrorists to gain admission to other States or as a means of safe haven. None of the 11 
September 2001 hijackers was a refugee or asylum seeker.
35 As the Howard League of 
Penal Reform wrote to the League of Nations in the 1930s, of the one and a quarter 
million refugees from the Russian and former Turkish empires assisted by the League, 
there was only one recorded terrorist case.
36 
Terrorists are far more likely to pursue illegal migration channels to infiltrate a State 
than to use asylum procedures. Asylum seekers are subject to rigorous identity and 
security  checks,  document  verification,  administrative  scrutiny  and  suspicion  of 
credibility, and, in some States, mandatory administrative detention.
37 
It is important to reject unwarranted linkages between terrorists and asylum.
38 Refugee 
law does not provide safe haven for terrorists and does not prevent prosecution of 
suspects.
39 As UNHCR notes, ‘any discussion on security safeguards should start from 
the  assumption  that  refugees  are  themselves  escaping  persecution  and  violence—
including  terrorist  acts’.
40 A t t e n t i o n  s h o u l d  f o c u s  o n  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  r e f u g e e s  
themselves, not just the security threats posed by refugees.
41 
￿￿￿ 
35 G Gilbert, ‘Protection After September 11
th’ (2003) 15 IJRL 1, 1; Zard, op cit, 32. 
36 Letter from the Howard League for Penal Reform (London) to the Secretary General of the League of 
Nations, 27 Mar 1935, LoN Archives Geneva Doc 3A/15105/15085/VI. 
37 Australia detains all asylum seekers arriving in Australia without permission: M Crock and B Saul, 
Future Seekers: Refugees and the Law in Australia (Federation Press, Sydney, 2002), 75-98. 
38 R Lubbers, ‘Message to the Special Meeting on Terrorism and International Law at the International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law’, San Remo, 30 May 2002; Kingsely Nyinah, 312; M Zard, ‘Exclusion, 
Terrorism and the Refugee Convention’ (2002) 13 FMR 32, 33; UNHCR Background Note, para 84. 
39 V Turk, ‘Forced Migration and Security’ (2003) 15 IJRL 113, 114, 118. 
40 Lubbers, op cit. 
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